Small Government in the 21st Century by Shibuya Hiroshi & 渋谷 博史
，，S顯all　Goverlu丑enも｝，
　　　　　　　　　　　　No．26
i 　七he　21s七　Century
Hiroshi　Shiわ級ya
Sep七e皿ber　ま996
Universi’ヒy　of　Tokyo
'iSMAX,L GOVERNMENTi" XN THE 2iST CENTURY
[Summary]
                                       MROSHX SHIBUYA
                                        (UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO)
     In this papex we tried to consider the fi$cai
reconstruct±on'processes in the gnited States and Japan
raainly fucom the viempoint of the "logic of taxpayer$", which
brings the pacessures to control the costs oE welfare state fior
the aged. But today's pressures toward "sraall geveynment" have
one more puacpose, to get rid of or to reduce the obstaeles
against market mGchnism and eeonomic gacowth, which auce brought
by interventions and reguiations of government.
     In 21st century, because oE the speed-up o£ the aging
trend and the explosion of welfare state costsf X think, moure
nceduction ofi govencrmental activ±ties in many fields wil! be
needed te puromobe eeonom±c gscowth and the iesulting expansSon
of tax base. Many liberai policy measure$, brought out by 20th
century "big government", can not be maintained.'
     Finally beca=se oE cost-explosion of the "aged-measure"
paxt of the welfare state, the "nonaged-rneasure" part comes
under much stxicter pacessures to be cut.
     I would hope that the representers and disputants in the
second session add this viewpoint to their discussion.
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     Paper to be pacesented at the Xnternatlonal Conference on
Evolvlnig Roles oi Government in Japan and the United State,
in Washington, D.C. on August 30,1996
(1)Introduction
     We are ISving now at the end of the 2eth eentuxy, when
volces clamex fox "small govescnment" in evexy advanced eoutry.
However today's "siaaU government" i$ not the same as 19th
century's one. Now it refers to the nece$sity to make the 20th
centuxy's "big goveacnment" more efEicient, and to control the
cost burden explosion. Zt is pexhaps ±xonic that the cau$e ofi
the pressures toward "$mall government" is the expectation
that the 21st century's "big government" w±ll be mueh bigger.
7]he historical t]rend oE aging, which began in the "affiuent
society" afteac world war IX, wUl go much further, so the cost
burden of 21st century's "big government" fouc the growing aged
part of the population will explode. Even now, slower economic
gucowth and the beginning oE the aging trend make us accutely
aware ofi the neee.ssi℃y to make preparations fer 21st centuyy's
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human soedety. Goverrment has been expected so farc to take a
kind of controlUng rcle on the capitalistic market econoray.
     In contxast, in the fourth quarter ofi 20th eentury, as a
result ofi long-mainicained gurewthf xesourses have become
tighter, and govennment is expected to play a new role to ease
the restrictive obstacles on bhe maxket, caused by both the
gacowing costs oi welfare state and governmental reguiattonal
measures.
     Let's consider the causes o£ 20th century's "big
goverrment". One of the most impoxtant features'of 20th
eentury was the economic transition from agricultural society
to industxial society. With industxialization the human
society obtained far largenc pxoductive ability than in the
19th century. Industriaiization and layger production were
±nitiated by corpoxation enterprises, especially big
busunesses. While in agricultural society people mainly worked
independently onc under smaU employers, the transition to
industriaX society made people woack undex large employeers. So
the Eruits o£ industrializat±on took the forms o£ corprate
prctits and wonkers' wages.
     Xn contrast to taxes on property oac good$ circulation in
l9th century agricutuxal society, taxation on individual and
corporate incomes could bring abundant and more income-
elast±stic revenue for governinent, to take iaany measures to
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control some of the unde$ixed effct$ of market ecoxxomy.
     The econowic t]ransition to industriaiized society and th'e
accompanying expansion of government's revenue base
s±multaneously increases the need of government interventlons
          'and strengthened iics ability to intexvene.
     Fosc exarRple, in the case of Japanese bakking regulation,
a govexnraent with a heavy tax system can use tax preferences
to induce banks to act in harmony with gove]nnent policy. In
the U.S.r government provides tax incentives with laurge tax
expenditure to many private pension funds in order to make
thern move into the fedaxal regulatory system and participate
the pen$ion benetits guarantee insurance of the PBGC.
     But, at the end of 20th century, the slow±ng-dewn of
economic growth and the fear o£ cost-explosion ofi the welfare
state bring the strong need to restructuxe the whole system oi
goverrment: tax system, social insurance (social security
pension, pubiid health insurance etc.>, welfare, housing
                          'poliey, urban policy, agricultural policy, financiai
regulation etc.
     In 20th centuxy, beeause the aging trend was not yet
seriogs, government could afford to intervene in many of the
field$ described above. Howevex, with the change of
conditions, government has to concentrate its resouncces iBte
puceparing for welfaace state systems fosc 21st ceRtury aged
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society. Other parts of "big governraent" are requested to be
dqwn-sized or to interven less in order to ease the depressing
effects on manket maehanism and economic gucowth.
     In my historical perspectiver eurrent strong pre$sures
for "small government" refieet$ the need to prepare fox an
aged society. Serious budget deticits ureveal the pressures.
AdVanced industrial countries are groping for a new "small
government" policy.The centemporary vexsion, however, dees not
imply a nceturn to i9ich-century-style iaissez-faixe, but simply
21st-century economized version ofi the "big government"
prodviced by industrialization and the welfaace state.
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<.2)TNE STRUTEfRZYL CHANGE OF TAX SY'SWEM XN THE VeSe
     AfteJr would wanc rX iedeucal revenue was mainiy provided by
taxation on individual and corporate incorae (f±guxe 1). This
£inanced federal goverrment defiense expendituxe (figure 2,
1955 and 1960 £iscal years) for the Pax-Americana system.
     !n the 1960's, Demoeratic administrations oE Xennedy and
Johnson imlementd liberal social welfare poliey ("Waur on
Poverty", "Gxeat Society" pxogram). Theaceafter, tisacl
structuaX change has been continuetng on both sides o£ acevenue
and expenditure. On expenditure side, while the share ofi
deafense has deereased, the shares of trans£er and aid-to-state
& local have increased, and on revenue sidGf that of social
security tax has increased and that of corporate income tax
has decreased.
     The inereased sha]es of transfe]r expenditure and social
security tax were caused by the expansion of social security
(basic national pension system) and Medicacre (natiQpal health
insu]rance £or the aged> in the 1960's. Through these
structural change, the federal governraent has been ±n a
transformation process fuom warfaxe state to welfaxe slate.
     In 1960's ecornomic pxosperity, taxpayexs accepted the
national decSsion to expand welfaxe state system and to
increase the cost buacden for it.' But in the 1970's and
1980's, because of worse economic pexformance and iarger-than-
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expected cost o£ welfare stater taxpayers began to request tax
cuts. Xn response to these popular demands, the Reagan
adrainistration･ cut the maximum rates of individual and
eoxporaice income taxes and modexated the progres$ive curves
with 1981 Economy Recovexy Tax Act and 1986 Tax Reform' Act.
     Olt the other hand, the Reagan administration increased
sociai secuxity tax rate and tax base maximum limit, whlch
meant an expansion o£ the tax baser with 1983 Soeial Secuxity
Reform Act. As the result fuorp these threa acts in the 1980's,
four points can be pointed out (£igure 1).
     Orter tetal federal revenue as percentage of GNp
decsceased.
     Twor individual income tax as pencentage of GN? was
maintained on same level. The effect of revenue-cut of the
1981 and 1986 acts was offset by revenue incyeases fxom
"braaket-cxeep" due to inilation.
     Threer coxporate incorae tax as pereentage of GNP
decreased. The cause wa$ that tax induaements fov new
in.vestnent were demanded to revive the sluggish American
economy.        '     Fouac, soeial security tax as pexeentage of GNP
drasbically inereased. Taxpayers, who demanded income tax
cutsr simultaneously accepted the incMease of social secuxity
taX.
     !n shoxtr cons±dexing en a longterm perspect±ve a£ter
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would war ZI (figusce 1 & 2), whUe 'accoMding to the relative
decncease of defense expenditure taxpayers demanded income tax
cuts, they aXso seleeted social security tax over the income
taxe$ to pay four burden of a gacowlng welfare state for the
aged persons. Befoace analyzing the meaning of this choice, let
us'brteEiy the nature o£ soeial security tax.
     !n the U.S. social security rneans a government-managed
bastc pension, which eonstitutes $oc±al insurance togetheur
with medicare, unemployment insurancer and othexs. Social
security was introduced as an irnportant part of the New Deal
in the 1930's Great Depression. However, xather than use of
generai revenue , a finance systera was adopted consistent with
the spirit of self-relian¢e: both employees and empleyers
contributed a social $ecurity tax. creating the basis of an
"eancned right". This is raost cleascly shown in the basie
principles of the sy$tem since its enactment by the 1935
Social Security Act.
      1. Employment xelationship principle: EligibiUty is
      based upon employment, and the amount of benefit is
      determined accordlng to past contributiQ.ns into the
      SyStem.
      2. No means-test: Because pens±on benestt is based upon
      "earned right", it is paid without a eons±deration of
      current assets.
      3. Contribution principle: This "eaacned right" is based
g
      upon the faet that present enployees pay social seeurity
      tax to Sinance pension,benefits for the pncesent aged
      ucetiacees. This tinance sys"tem is called "bhe "pay--as---you-
      go" system.
      4. Universal mandatory partiqipation: Paticipatien is
     un±versal and mandatoyy, for spreading and minimizing
      risk, and enabling soeial seeurity basic economic
  - seeurity forc the entire soeiety-
      5. Megal ulght system: Pension right aye clearly
      stipuiated in the law, so room for administrative
      diseretion ±s severely acestxicted.
     Concretizing these basic pstnciples aace the nature of
secial security tax and the benef±t calculate foxmula. Unlike
individual income tax, social security tax has no pexsonal
exemption. On the contraxy, it has a maximum 1±mit on taxable
income. Fonc exampie, in 1992, the maximura limit was $55,500.
[VhereEosce, even if a person ea]rBed $100,OOO, only $55,500 of
the income wa$ subject te social secunity tax, resulting in a
$8,415 contribution at the 15.3ig proportional rate. Of that
rate, 11.3rg share would go to Old Age Survivoxs Xnsurance,
1.2ig to DisabiUty Znsurance, and 2.9g to Kedicare-.
     Pension benefit is calcuiated Scrom historical records of
taxable income. First, the AI)EE (average indexed monthly
earnings) is calculated by xe-evaluatSon <wage index) ofi
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historicai areco3ds of taxable ±ncorae. For exarnl>le, in the case
of person with a A!ME of $3,OOO, his basic beneEit anount is
$1071.07, which is the total o£ $348.30 (O.90 of the tirst
$387 of AXME), $662.72 <O.32 of the next'$1946 of AISEE), and
$100.15 (O.15 oS the reraaining $667).
     This beneEit formula has two chancacteristies. First, a
person with higher ineome during the period o.fi employment caR
geti higher pension bene£it after retirement. However, the
second charactenistic is that, because as AXus inereases the
replacement rate faUs, the fomula has a redistributive
eEfect.
     But, despite this eredistributive e££ect, the tir$t
characteistic make$ clearc the connection between contxibutlon
and benetit. The eoncept of "earned pens±on right" by payment
of soeial security tax is based upon it. Because off this
conceptr American taxpayers pre£er social $ecurity tax to
individuaiincometax. '
     As a result, even as the aging of the population was
inereasing the cest of wel£are state, taxpayers demanded cuts
in general revenue (income tax, property tax, etc.), which has
no clear cennectioR between burden and beRefit, while
accepting an increase o£ social security tax. The use ofi
general revenue for the education of pse-employment
babyboomers in the 1950's and i960's was pexmitted, but it was
decided that welfare state ior the retired aged should be
                             zo
tinanced by a systellt xefiecting the re$ults ofi economic
activities during wonking days.
     X think that it is particular American to have the
soaiety shave the cost of paceparation fox wonk, but to piace
pension bene£its after retiyement on self-reliance principie.
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(3) Financial veconstyuction in Japan
    .Fiscal reorganization in the 1980'$ was motivated by the
recovexy pxocess fxom the laacge deficits of the 1970's. On the
surface, cutback in sociai welfaace and efficiency puromotion
in pubiic sector, for deticit reduction, were impressive.
However, we $hould not igeore an impoxtant historical trend,
analyzed below, underlying these phenomena.                                                 '                                                       i     As shown in Table i, 2 and 3 (percentage o£ GNP), while
general goveacnment, which is the net total of eentral
goveurnmentt local goveacrment, and $oeial secuxity fund, had a
tiscal suyplus Qfi 1.87& in l970, it was in deflelt of 4.05& in
1980, a detenioacation by 5.912. Yet in 1990, the fiscai
balance impxoved 2.94 points to a 1.11g deticit.
     This wide swing der±ved mainly from activities of central
government. Another important point to note is that fiscal
surplus of social security fund grew steadily, £rom 2.30ig in
1970 to 2.64g in 1980 to 3.46ig in 1993.                                                       '     In the pxocess of these fiscal reconstruction, undex the
pressure for down-sizing and efficiency of pubUc sector,
process was made in the reorgan±zating the welfaxe state
system, whose main part is social insurancesr forc prepancation
to 21$t centu3ry aged $ociety. Thexein, the "logic of
taxpayers", who beaac the cost burdenr took an important role.
     GeReyally taxpayers wotk and eaua in the !rtanket economyr
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where payments are to get someth±ng useful and payers, with
considertng the degree of the usefuiness, decided to pay or
not bo pay the pxice of it. But taxpayers cannot necessarily
get anything with tax payment. Sor first, they always want to
minimize the slze Qf .public sector and their cost burden.
Second, they preEer social security contnibutions bo genera1
tax <income tax, etc.) because the formeM has a reiatively
direct connection between cost and benefit.
     From these viewpoints, We will analyze the Japanese
tiscai structuye.
     On examination o£ Table 1 & 2, We can find two point$.
     (1) General govencnment's net total current ucevenue,
which is calculated by excXusion of transfers between
subsector$ frorn tatal, rose from 21.19% in 1970 to 28.16% in
1980. But, euncvent outlay and capital outlay grew more
drasticaliy, so that the E±scal balance of general govencnment
deteriorated by 5.91 points, from 1.86g suicpius to 4.05rg
decifit. The eentral government's decitit was particulaxly
laacge, and was financed by public debt issues.
     (2) On iche other hand, current ncevenue oE social secumity
fund reached IC.79% in 1980, an incxease of 5.03g. Zts share
of net totaZ of general government acose trom 28rg in 197e to
39g ±n 1980. While subsectoacs o£ centxal and local governments
expanded wtth deficit and borrowing, the soaial security fund
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expanded with surplus and aqeuraulation of resexve asset$. The
hreakdown of its revenue was 7.41g from social security
contribution, 2.34g frora inter-governmentai txansfex, 1.20rg
fiacom property income <from reseacve assets). Xts financiai
asset$ as a share of GNP xose from 10.8ag in i970 to 20.0& in
1980.
Next we wUl exarrtine recent trend in Table 3 <1993 FY).
     (1) Fiscal balance of genexal govexnment was imprcved by
2.94 points, £rom 4.05Z deficit in 1980 to l.11g dec±Eit in
1993. The ma±n cause of this was the centara± governmentr
whose balanee was Smproved by 2.50 points <l.08 poinics
incucease in vevenue and 1.42 points decxease in outlays).
     Tltat was a £avoral)le contrast to the Vnited States, where
weak economic performance resulted in stagnant incorae gxowich,
aceinforcing the "logic gf taxpayers" and bninging about tax
cuts. As a result, federal government's general revenue other
than sociai security tax declined as a share oE GNP. However,
little progeress was raade in reducing outlays, and huge
decifit nceraained unchanged.
      On the handr in Japan, both tax incxeases and outiay
guts were accepted by taxpayers.
     (2) Pressure for tax cuts was not so strong in Japan
because the reai income of taxpayers inexeased, due te
eontinued economic grcwth and stTenger international
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compet±tiveness-. Rather, in Japan, the "logic of taxpayers"
was demonstrated by the outlay cut foac improvement of iiseal
baiance.
     Central government's current and capitai outlays as
Percentage of GNP declined from 14.49ig and 3.50rg in 1980 to
13.62eg and 2.91ag in 1993. Both of its own outlays and txanfiers
to other subseators decreased.
  - The soeial security fund Eelt the largest impact of these
cuts. WhUe its currenic rev'en e as percentage of GNP rose by
3.61 points fMom 10.97Z to 14.58ig, tncansfer drom other
subsectors (mainly centaral government) acose only by O.32
points £ucora 2.34ig to 2.66ig.
     There£or6r we can conclude that, in this reconstructuring
psecess, taxpayexs prefexed $ocial secuntty contributions and
its relatively dixeet connection between cost and benetit to
generai taxation. By the way, social security fund's own
revenue as net totai revenue of general government rose from
30.6g to 35.9g.
     These structual change in general govexnment had also a
large impaat on the structure in soc±al securrity fund.
     Its main schemes are national pens±on insurance(mainiy
iox the self-empioyed), Kose± pension insurance (governmenV
managed pension insuxance for empioyees), Kosei pension
associations (employers-rnanegement), national health insurance
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(mainly for the sel£-employed)r employexs-managed health
insuurance associations, and government-raanaged health
xnsuxance.
     National pension insurance and national health insuvance
have more "raaturity", which is measured by the cratio of the
aged (retirees) to the active wonkers, than other schemes.
Geneyally, "maturity" brings wo3rse fLcal eoi}dLtions because
the ratio of total costs oi pension benefits or health caxe to
total centr±butions becomes larcgeur with its progres$.
     Sor in the 1970's, central government transfered money to
the two schemes. But, in the 1980'sg in fiscal restructuring
of centMal governvaent, as Sts E±scal aSd to the two schemes
was checked, other schemes in social security subsector
decided to rtnance the deficits of the two shemes . In Table 2
& 3, between.1980 and 1993, incxease ofi transfer fiucom central
govexnment could not eatch up with the growth of whole social
seeurity fund. With increase of its own revenue, 8.63ig in 1980
to 11.92& in 1993, tiscal adjustment was made among schemes in
this subsector.
                                             '
     The money channel o£ Siscal aid for moxe "maturced" shemes
were shifted fuova inter-subsector one to within-subsectonc one.
rehe main raetive foac these change and sceform of social
insurance system, oE coaMse, is the need of preparation for
the truely aged society in near future. However. in the iight
of the "logic of taxpayers", their prefexence of social
16
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(4) !Vwo pails oE 21st Cetu3ry's "Small Goveinment"
     In this paper we txied te consider the fiscal
nceconstruction processes in the United States and Japan
mainly £rom the viewpoint oE the "logic of taxpayers", which
brings the pscessures to control the costs ofi wettave state for
the aged. But, as I indiaated in the introduction section,
                                 'today's pre$sures toward "smail governmen.t" have one more
puxpose, to get xid of ox to reduce the obstacles against
maacket mechni$m qnd economic growth,.which are brought by
interventions and ucequlations of government.
     Xn the Eield$ oE housing poliey, conEaunity development,
agricutuxe poliey, and E±nane±al regulation, which ave
discus$ed in the seeond sessien of this conference, four the$e
policy puxposes, goveacnmentai interven℃ions and reguiations
                                               'have been and are being ureduced drasticaily.
     In 21st century, because of the speed-up of the aging
trend and the explosion oi welfare state costs, X thlnk, more
reducbion of govexnmental aetlvities in these tields wiU be
needed to psomote econonic gpowth and the resulting expansion
oti tax base. Many liberal poli¢y measuxes, burought out by 20th
century "big goveacnmenic", ean not be maintained.
     Finaily because oi cost-explosion of the "aged-raeasuxe"
part of the welfare state, the "nonaged-measure" part comes･
uRder rauch stricteac pressures to be cut.,
i8
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